On June 13, 2005, the Supremes handed down their decision in Bradshaw v. Stumpf. Scroll down to see how they ruled.
While prosecutors most often hold the upper hand in a criminal case because of the presumably deep pockets of the government, what the sovereign can do to secure a conviction is certainly not unlimited. The U.S. Constitution requires that criminal defendants be accorded Due Process of law, which simply put, means the state is required to play fair.
The question of “fundamental fairness” in the judicial process is one that has prompted countless criminal appeals and has been refined over 200 years of American criminal jurisprudence. In the 2004-2005 term, the United States Supreme Court is poised to rule on one aspect that asks whether the State can present two distinct theories of a crime — and evidence — to convict two different defendants.
Specifically, in the case of Mitchell v. Stumpf, argued earlier in April, among other questions, the High Court was asked “Whether due process requires the re-evaluation of a defendant’s conviction and death sentence when the prosecutor repudiated the theory and evidence used to secure that defendant’s conviction and sentence in order to try and convict a second defendant.”
This is not a new question. In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J. concurring), the Supreme Court wrote, “the State’s obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility to provide a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Most of the facts in the Stumpf case are not in dispute by either party, and the appellate court provided an excellent summary of what happened that night in 1984.
“On May 14, 1984, Stumpf, Clyde Daniel Wesley, and Norman Leroy Edmonds, after visiting a bar in Washington, Pennsylvania, got on Interstate 70 and headed west toward Ohio. By sundown, they had reached Guernsey County. They stopped their car along I-70 and, leaving Edmonds in the car, Stumpf and Wesley walked to a nearby house under the pretense of needing to make a phone call. The house they chose was owned and occupied by Norman and Mary Jane Stout. Stout admitted Stumpf and Wesley into his home and allowed them to use the phone. When they had completed the call, both Stumpf and Wesley produced pistols and announced a robbery. Stumpf held the Stouts at gunpoint in a back bedroom while Wesley searched the house for items to steal.
“At some point, Stout moved toward Stumpf, and Stumpf shot him between the eyes with his pistol. The shot was not fatal, and Stout subsequently pushed Stumpf into the next room. During this altercation, Stout was struck on the head with a pistol and shot in the head a second time. These actions were enough to render him semi-conscious but not to kill him.
“While lying on the floor in the other room, Stout heard four gunshots. There is no dispute that Mary Jane Stout was shot and killed during the course of this robbery, although there is a dispute as to whether Stumpf or Wesley fired the fatal shots.(My emphasis…this is the point in question). After Mrs. Stout was killed, Stumpf and Wesley stole the Stouts’ car and fled. Stumpf was arrested several days later, and after initially denying any knowledge about these crimes and then being told that Stout had survived, he confessed to being involved.” Stumpf v. Mitchell 367 F.3d 594, 597.
On the advice of his attorneys, Stumpf pleaded guilty to aggravated murder with a death penalty specification. The defense team argued during the evidentiary hearing to establish a factual basis for the plea that he did not shoot Mrs. Stout and further argued that he was not present when the victim was shot. The state argued in response that Stumpf was the shooter.
Specifically, Prosecutor James R. Scott told the court during opening arguments in the evidentiary hearing, “[b]elieving that he had killed Mr. Stout, Stumpf then turned the same chrome colored Raven automatic pistol upon Mary Jane Stout as she sat on the bed and shot her four times. Three times in the left side of the head and neck and one time in the wrist, obviously in order not to leave anyone available to identify him. Two of the bullets entered her brain and she died instantly.”
The three-judge panel that heard the case adopted the state’s theory, finding that Stumpf was the actual shooter.
However, later, during Wesley’s trial, Prosecutor Scott told the jury in opening arguments that Wesley fired the fatal shots.
“Believing that he had killed Mr. Stout, John David Stumpf pitched the gun aside and left the immediate area back the hallway down the steps to the basement,” Scott said. “At that point (Wesley) whose own gun was jammed, picked that chrome colored Raven up and as Mrs. Stout sat helplessly on her bed, shot her four times in order to leave no witnesses to the crime they thought they had committed in the other killing they thought they had committed.”
The State then presented a jailhouse witness who said Wesley confessed to him. The jury in that case convicted Wesley of aggravated murder, but opted not to give him the death penalty.
Once Wesley was convicted of committing the same crime, Stumpf sought to rescind his guilty plea. “When Stumpf sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of Wesley’s conviction, the state opposed his motion, arguing that the informant’s testimony was unreliable,” the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in its factual findings of the case.
The appellate panel found that a lower federal court should have granted Stumpf’s motion for a writ of habeas corpus, and the State of Ohio appealled to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In their briefs, the two sides were (obviously) diametrically opposed.
“An ‘inconsistent theories’ due process claim requires some showing that the prosecutor’s conduct has materially undermined the reliability of a trial or proceeding,” wrote the State of Ohio in its brief. “Stumpf cannot clear that hurdle here. Nor can Stumpf show that the prosecutor here secured inconsistent convictions. Stumpf and Wesley are both criminally liable for aggravated murder, so their convictions are not inconsistent. At bottom, Stumpf’s due process claim is really an ‘actual innocence’ claim in disguise, but he cannot succeed on that claim.”
Stumpf, the respondent at this level, argued differently.
“The court determined that the use and subsequent failure to correct these inconsistent prosecutorial theories violated the principle of fundamental fairness the Due Process Clause protects,” his appellate team wrote. “The court then found that the state’s contention that the positions were not inconsistent because neither conviction turned on the identity of the shooter contradicted the clear requirements of Ohio’s aggravated murder statute. Stumpf’s conviction and death sentence, according to the judicial panel that reviewed and entered his plea, hinged on his status as the principal offender. Once the state undermined that conclusion, Stumpf’s plea no longer satisfied the intent requirement; therefore, the conviction and death sentence lost all credibility.”
The final word, of course, lies with the Supremes. Stay tuned.

From the U.S. Supreme Court opinion 534 U.S. ___ (June 13, 2005):

1. The Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that Stumpf was uninformed of the aggravated murder charge’s specific intent element. While a guilty plea is invalid if the defendant has not been informed of the crime’s elements, Stumpf ’s attorneys represented at his plea hearing that they had explained the elements to their client, and Stumpf confirmed that the representation was true. This Court has never held that the judge must himself explain a crime’s elements to the defendant. Rather, constitutional requirements may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the charge’s nature and the crime’s elements were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. … Finally, the plea’s validity may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that Stumpf made what he now claims was a bad deal. Pp. 6-10.
2. The Sixth Circuit was also wrong to hold that prosecutorial inconsistencies between the Stumpf and Wesley cases required voiding Stumpf ’s guilty plea. The precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to Stumpf ’s aggravated murder conviction, and Stumpf has never explained how the prosecution’s postplea use of inconsistent arguments could have affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his plea. P. 11.
3. The prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent theories may have a more direct effect on Stumpf’s sentence, however, for it is arguable that the sentencing panel’s conclusion about his role was material to its sentencing determination. The opinion below leaves some ambiguity as to the overlap between how the lower court resolved Stumpf ’s due process challenge to his conviction and how it resolved his challenge to his sentence. It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals would have found Stumpf entitled to resentencing had it not also considered the conviction invalid. Likewise, the parties’ briefing here, and the question on which this Court granted certiorari, largely focused on the conviction. In these circumstances, it would be premature for this Court to resolve the merits of Stumpf’s sentencing claim before giving the Sixth Circuit the opportunity to consider in the first instance the question of how the prosecutor’s conduct in the Stumpf and Wesley cases related to Stumpf ’s death sentence in particular. Pp. 11-12.
367 F. 3d 594, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.